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The purpose of bail must be evaluated in light of the purpose of pre-trial detention. Bail is not 
intended as a punitive measure. The Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 contains various elements that 
guide a court in determining whether it is in the interests of justice to grant bail. Unfortunately, courts 
have been known to deny bail by giving undue weight to some factors and ignoring others, including 
the denial of bail on the basis that a lack of sufficient assets owned by accused persons means that 
they are likely to be flight risks. Additionally, the denial of bail on the basis of a lack of a verifiable fixed 
residential address has also affected the assessment of potential to abscond trial. Both of these 
issues: ownership of assets and a fixed residential address, while distinct factors, stem from a similar 
indicator – that of the economic standing of the accused. This is arguably discriminatory in terms of 




A well-known Anatole France quote reads, ‘The 
poor have to labour in the face of the majestic 
equality of the law, which forbids the rich as well 
as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets, and to steal bread’. France’s point was 
that an indigent accused is destined to suffer at 
the hands of the criminal justice system more 
than a wealthy accused. Despite assistance 
provided to an accused, structural inequalities 
exist in almost every aspect of South African 
life. This includes the criminal justice system, 
where legal representation is more difficult to 
obtain, and the value of the legal representation 
may differ, based on the amount an accused 
is able to pay for it.1 In the context of bail, an 
accused who is able to demonstrate close ties 
to a community and family, who has permanent 
employment, and who owns assets, is less 
likely to be deemed a potential flight risk than 
an accused without these. Section 60(6) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (Act 51 of 1977, or 
the CPA) attempts to balance this by considering 
the extent to which an accused can afford to 
forfeit the bail amount and the means and travel 
documents that would enable him or her to leave 
the country. The latter two considerations will, 
in most cases, affect a wealthier accused rather 
than a poorer one. This article considers the 
South African courts’ approach to establishing 
whether an accused person is a ‘flight risk’. 
It argues that this process can prejudice an 
indigent accused. 
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My interest in this issue was sparked in 2013 
while conducting research in the Johannesburg 
and Randburg magistrate’s courts.2 Building on 
that work, I have more recently observed 37 first 
appearance bail decisions in two magistrate’s 
courts in Cape Town.3 In this article I draw 
on these anecdotal observations, and review 
judgments from high courts (matters appealed 
from magistrate’s courts), to argue that bail 
inquiries are not always fairly assessed. 
Legislative ambit
It has been more than 15 years since the 
important Constitutional Court judgement in S 
v Dlamini, S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; 
S v Schietekat, which pronounced on the 
constitutionality of some of the bail provisions 
contained in section 60 of the CPA.4 This textual 
review of bail in South Africa’s criminal procedure 
was an important one in outlining the legal 
framework within which the application of bail 
should operate. Although section 60 of the CPA 
was generally constitutionally endorsed, each 
provision was not individually tested. Rather, the 
court took the view that the factors were merely a 
codification of the common law position in terms 
of the judicial approach to the granting or denial 
of bail.5 The practical impact of these provisions 
are yet to be appraised with respect to their equal 
and fair application. Prior to the amendment of 
bail in the CPA, the statutory provisions were 
largely restricted to the procedural requirements 
for bail. No guidance was provided to a court 
regarding what it ought to consider in determining 
whether bail should be granted.
Section 12 of the Constitution protects everyone’s 
right ‘not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily 
or without just cause’.6 In terms of section 35 
of the Constitution, which deals specifically with 
the rights of accused, arrested and detained 
persons, all accused persons have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty.7 Section 
35(1)(f), in particular, enshrines the right ‘to be 
released from detention if the interests of justice 
permit, subject to reasonable conditions’. It is 
in this light that the purpose of bail under the 
criminal justice system must be understood, and 
the bail process is governed primarily in chapter 
9 of the CPA.8 The purpose of bail must also 
be considered in light of the purpose of pre-trial 
detention, which is to ensure that an accused 
presents himself at court for trial. Sections 58 to 
70 of this chapter deal with a number of aspects 
relating to the system of bail, including the effect 
of bail (section 58), the procedure of applying 
for bail and the factors to be considered by the 
court (section 60), conditions of bail that a court 
may set (sections 62 and 63), failure of accused 
released on bail to appear for trial (section 67), 
and cancellation of bail (section 68). Section 50(6) 
requires specific mention. Although it falls outside 
of the bail chapter, section 50 generally contains 
the procedure after arrest and subsection (6) 
contains the procedures relating to bail. 
The provision of particular relevance is section 
60. Section 60(1)(a) elaborates on the section 35 
right to be released where the interests of justice 
permit, and states as follows:
An accused who is in custody in respect of 
an offence shall, subject to the provisions 
of section 50(6), be entitled to be released 
on bail at any stage preceding his or her 
conviction in respect of such offence, if the 
court is satisfied that the interests of justice 
so permit. (own emphasis)
There is nothing to criticise in this provision. In 
fact, it is a progressive section that clearly aims 
to give effect to the relevant constitutional rights. 
The essential question is, therefore, in what 
circumstances and on what basis does a court 
determine that the interests of justice permit the 
release of a person on bail?
When do the interests of justice 
permit release?
A value judgement by a court is required 
to determine whether there are factors that 
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constitute release, based on the dictates of the 
‘interests of justice’.9 Such a value judgement 
must include an analysis of three categories 
of interests, which may or may not conflict 
with each other. The court must balance the 
rights of the accused to be presumed innocent 
and to not be deprived of his or her liberty 
without just cause, with the rights of society in 
general to safety and security. Both the rights 
of the accused and those of society must be 
balanced alongside the interests of the criminal 
justice system to ensure that the investigation 
and prosecution of criminal matters are not 
impeded.10 This is illustrated in the following 
bail judgement:
The common law and the Constitution 
demand an equilibrium between the 
importance of freedom and the broad interest 
of justice. The primary objective of the criminal 
process regarding the phase before the trial is 
to bring the accused before a court, and there 
to confront him or her with the allegations of 
the prosecution. For that reason the court 
gives its support, where necessary, to steps 
aimed at preventing flight, obstruction of the 
police investigation, interference with State 
witnesses or concealment/destruction of real 
evidence. The courts have done this by means 
of bail conditions and criteria which have been 
thrashed out judicially over the years.11
Section 35(1)(f) (read with the general limitations 
clause in section 36) of the Constitution, which 
includes the caveat that release is contingent 
on the interests of justice, implicitly recognises 
that the continued detention of a person 
suspected of having committed an offence may 
be a justifiable limitation on an accused’s right 
to liberty.12 Section 60(4) of the CPA sets out 
the grounds on which a court must establish if 
release should not be permitted:
(a) Where there is the likelihood that the 
accused, if he or she were released on bail, 
will endanger the safety of the public or any 
particular person or will commit a Schedule 1 
offence; or 
(b) where there is the likelihood that the accused, 
if he or she were released on bail, will attempt 
to evade his or her trial; or 
(c) where there is the likelihood that the accused, 
if he or she were released on bail, will attempt 
to influence or intimidate witnesses or to 
conceal or destroy evidence; or
(d) where there is the likelihood that the accused, 
if he or she were released on bail, will 
undermine or jeopardise the objectives or 
the proper functioning of the criminal justice 
system, including the bail system; or
(e)  where in exceptional circumstances there is 
the likelihood that the release of the accused 
will disturb the public order or undermine the 
public peace or security.
These are factors that the court must take into 
account when determining if the interests of 
justice permit the release of the accused. Thus, 
where there is no likelihood that the accused 
poses a potential danger to individuals or their 
community, and there is no reason to believe the 
accused will interfere with witnesses, abscond 
from trial or otherwise impede the administration 
of justice, there is no justifiable limitation on the 
accused’s freedom. The court should make use 
of these factors as guidelines, and be flexible 
to give effect to fairness and justice.13 In other 
words, the factors contained in section 60(4) are 
not a closed list that excludes other potentially 
relevant considerations.14 Ideally, these factors 
should be balanced against each other, and one 
factor being present should not automatically 
result in a denial of bail. 
None of the above is cause for alarm. In fact, the 
list of grounds contains important considerations 
that indisputably relate to the interests of justice. 
Subsections (5) to (8A) include more detail 
about what must be considered for each of 
the grounds above. Section 60(4)(b) (and the 
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expanded considerations under subsection (6)) 
is also, unlike the other factors of section 60(4), 
intrinsically connected to the primary purpose 
of pre-trial detention, which is to ensure that 
the accused will stand trial. Thus, whether the 
accused is a likely ‘flight risk’ is a relevant factor 
when determining if the granting of bail is in the 
interests of justice. Section 60(6) is the most 
relevant for the purposes of this article because 
it expands on the factors that can assist in 
assessing the possibility that an accused will 
evade trial. 
Does a lack of assets make 
one a flight risk?
Bail may be legitimately refused if there is a 
likelihood that the accused will attempt to evade 
his or her trial.15 Which factors are considered in 
assessing the risk of absconding trial, and how 
they are weighed up, are relevant in determining 
whether the bail provisions are being fairly 
implemented. In this regard, this article 
specifically considers two of these factors, 
namely section 60(6)(a) and (b): ‘the emotional, 
family, community or occupational ties of the 
accused to the place at which he or she is to be 
tried’ and ‘the assets held by the accused and 
where such assets are situated’. The argument 
is tendered here that the factors in section 60 
that relate to whether the accused is a flight 
risk, namely familial and community, relate 
(albeit not exclusively) to the existence of a 
verified fixed address and ownership of assets, 
and are subject to criticism for their potentially 
prejudicial effect on economically vulnerable and 
poor people. 
Establishing proof of residential address is 
required before bail will be considered by the 
court.16 The failure to have established this by 
the time of the accused’s first appearance in the 
district magistrate’s courts where bail hearings 
ordinarily take place, can result in bail hearings 
being postponed for up to seven days under 
section 50(6)(d)(i) of the CPA. This makes sense, 
because if an accused were to be released on 
bail the absence of a known address would 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to find him or 
her again.17 This seems to be how the matter 
is decided in practice. Between the Cape Town 
and Wynberg magistrate’s courts, 16 of the 
37 cases observed were postponed in terms 
of section 50(6)(d)(i), pending verification of a 
permanent residential address by the South 
African Police Service (SAPS). In five separate 
cases, bail was denied on the basis of the SAPS 
being unable to locate the address provided 
by the accused as a residential address. In 
all of these cases the bail hearing had been 
postponed at least once before. 
Where a fixed address is not present, a court 
will be less likely to believe that an accused’s 
trial attendance is secure.18 It would be onerous 
for the state to attempt to contact or monitor 
an accused for the purposes of a trial where 
no fixed address is verified. However, the mere 
possibility that one or more of the factors in 
section 60(4) may arise, is not sufficient.19 A 
finding of a probability of a section 60(4) factor 
is necessary before it can be declared that the 
interests of justice permit bail to be denied.20 
Moreover, the court in S v Pineiro held that 
any concerns relating to section 60(4) factors 
could be dealt with by attaching relevant 
bail conditions in terms of section 60(12).21 
Therefore it is argued that there must be 
something more that renders a person a flight 
risk in order for bail to be denied in the interests 
of justice. The absence of a fixed address 
cannot be the sole basis for that assessment.
Courts have also emphasised that a lack of 
sufficient assets owned by accused persons 
may be viewed as an indicator of possible 
flight. In seven of the cases observed in 
the Cape Town courts a lack of assets was 
deemed an indicator of the likelihood of flight. 
In three of these cases, although the accused 
were employed, they were still deemed ‘likely 
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to abscond’.22 None of the seven cases 
considered the use of conditions to ameliorate 
the risk of flight. 
The court in the case of S v Mazibuko and 
Another considered the assets owned by the 
accused, as submitted into evidence, to show 
that they were not flight risks:23 
As far as their personal circumstances are 
concerned, the appellants stated in their 
affidavits that they were self-employed, 
earning R7 000 and R6 000 per month 
respectively, that they had permanent 
residences, in the case of the first appellant 
that he owned an immovable property, 
that they both owned vehicles and 
household possessions, and that they 
had dependants. However, the evidence 
of Pillay, which was not contradicted, 
cast serious doubt on the truthfulness 
of these assertions. Firstly, he stated 
that the first appellant had told him that 
he was unemployed. Secondly, despite 
being requested to do so, the second 
appellant was unable to supply Pillay with 
the registration number of the vehicle 
which he allegedly owned and used in his 
taxi business. Pillay was therefore unable 
to verify that the second appellant in fact 
owned a motor vehicle. Thirdly, Pillay 
established that the first appellant did not in 
fact own the property he claimed to own. 
The court goes on to say: 
In the circumstances, I am by no means 
satisfied that the appellants made out a 
case that they were not flight risks, let alone 
a case that there was an exceptionally 
good chance that they would stand trial.24 
Although this case deals with schedule 6 
offences, where the person applying for bail 
must show that exceptional circumstances exist 
for the bail to be granted, the reasoning of the 
court is nonetheless relevant to cases outside of 
schedule 5 or 6 to which bail applies. The  
court considered the employment status and 
asset ownership relevant and important to 
whether the accused were flight risks.25 The 
court in S v Porthen held that showing that an 
accused does not fit any of the section 60(4) 
factors, which would include that the accused  
is not a flight risk, can be an exceptional 
circumstance in the context of the facts.26 In  
that light, the court’s assessment of ‘flight risk’ 
factors is appropriate and relevant outside of 
schedule 6 situations. 
In S v Masoanganye and Another, the facts 
were based on three accused, where one of 
them was tried separately. The accused 
tried separately was granted bail, but the 
other two co-accused were not. The Appeal 
Court criticised the court a quo for focusing 
primarily on a lack of assets by the accused in 
question, saying:
On a conspectus of the judgment as a 
whole it seems that what the learned judge 
had in mind was that the appellants could 
produce further evidence concerning their 
assets — the only matter that she dealt 
with in her judgment. Her judgment boils 
down to this: she was not satisfied that the 
appellants were not a flight risk because 
they did not have sufficient assets. Ahmed, 
who had sufficient assets, was held not 
to be a flight risk for that reason only.27 
(own emphasis)
The court in the 1997 case of S v Letaoana 
said that ‘to take into account the minimal 
assets possessed by an accused as a factor for 
refusing bail is tantamount to imposing a penalty 
for poverty’.28 This was said in the context 
of an accused who resided with his parents 
and was still at high school. In this case, the 
detective investigating the matter had testified 
at the bail hearing that: ‘Ek is nie seker nie, as 
hy miskien ... nie terug hof toe kom nie, sal ek 
nie weet waar om hom op te spoor nie,’29 which 
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loosely translates as ‘I’m not sure, if he does 
not return to court I would not know where to 
find him.’ He further testified as to the amount 
of clothing that the accused had at his parents’ 
house, and that it could easily be removed if 
the accused decided to abscond. The appeal 
judge stated that there were various reasons 
that pointed to the granting of bail to be in the 
interests of justice, namely that at the time of 
the accident the appellant was 20 years old, 
he was a scholar at Landula High School in 
Standard 10, he lived with his parents, he 
was not in possession of a passport, and he 
had no previous convictions.30 The basis of 
denying bail in the trial court was based on an 
assessment of danger to the accused himself, 
but arguably largely focused on the testimony 
of the detective as well as the magistrate’s 
view that the accused ‘has no real assets of 
value, no fixed property, and only a bed and his 
clothing’.31 The appeal judge overturned the 
denial of bail, stating that a number of factors 
should be considered together. 
As the court in Letaoana said, the assets held 
by the accused outside the country may be 
relevant to a consideration of the practical 
possibility that they would have somewhere to 
go should they evade trial. As argued above, 
a single factor that points to the possibility of 
a flight risk is not sufficient to deny bail in the 
interests of justice. There must be some other 
factor(s) that point to such a likelihood, such as 
the ownership of property, which would support 
other considerations. The argument is even 
more poignant in the case of a lack of assets. 
Unless there is some reason to believe that the 
accused will abscond, a lack of ownership of 
assets is a discriminatory basis for denying bail. 
Even if it is accepted that the lack of assets in 
section 60(6) is sufficient to deem an accused 
a flight risk, the bail inquiry requires that the 
accused’s likelihood of absconding trial would 
still have to be evaluated in terms of section 
60(9) of the CPA, balancing the interests of 
justice with the right of the accused to personal 
liberty. The court in Prokureur-Generaal stated 
the following in this respect:
Even when it is found that grounds justifying 
detention in the interest of justice exist, 
then such grounds are merely provisional 
grounds justifying refusal of the application. 
Subsection 60(9) specifically provides 
that the ‘matter’ must be determined ‘by 
weighing the interests of justice against the 
right of the accused to his or her personal 
freedom’. To a certain extent, the provisions 
of s 60(9) are confusing, but they make 
sense if one reads the words ‘prima facie’ 
into the introductory sentence of s 60(4) so 
that the sentence would read as follows: 
‘(4) The refusal to grant bail and the 
detention of an accused in custody 
shall be prima facie in the interests 
of justice where one or more of the 
following grounds are established.’32
It seems from the cases (both those observed 
and the reported judgements) described 
herein, however few, that the number and 
value of assets an accused owns is a relevant 
consideration for magistrates in assessing 
whether the interests of justice permit release. 
The extent of the primacy of this one factor as 
it is applied in courts gives rise to the need to 
refocus the purpose of bail and the impact of the 
factors evaluated. While it may not be necessary 
or desirable to remove ownership of assets 
from the list of factors that point to whether an 
accused is a flight risk or not, more thought must 
be given to the interplay of the various factors. 
There are other ways of mitigating the lack of 
a fixed permanent address or no ownership of 
assets. Section 60(2B)(a) and (b) and section 
60(12) of the CPA provide the possibility of 
imposing alternative bail conditions that can 
be used to minimise the risk of the accused 
absconding.33 For example, requiring an accused 
to report at a police station, daily, bi-weekly or 
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